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Abstract
This paper studies ’Stylised Facts’ and ’Determinants’ of short-and long-term
CDS-spreads of banks. As short-term spreads we choose 6M-, as long-term
spreads we choose 5Y-spreads. In the section ’Stylised Facts’ we found that
the correlation between short- and long-term spreads for the total period is
high (97%). However, the correlation in sub-periods varies across all possible
correlations. Particularly, spreads can have negative correlation. In contrast
to [Covitz and Downing, 2007], we ﬁnd high positive (Covitz/Downing: high
negative) correlation for turbulent market circumstances. In the section ’Detem-
inants’ we conﬁrm the Merton-factors (stock price, stock price volatility, interest
rate level) for the 5Y-segment, but not for the 6M-segment. Furthermore, we do
not ﬁnd any empirical support that short-term spreads are particularly sensitive
to illiquidity factors. In that sense, we also contrast [Covitz and Downing, 2007].







Credit risk and credit spreads have been the risk category ’en vogue’ during the last
decade. The literature about credit spreads can be categorized into (i) Stylised Facts,
(ii) Pricing and (iii) Determinants of Spreads. Concerning the instruments, research
has been ﬁrst centred around corporate bond spreads. With the introduction of
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and their increasing market liquidity, research shifted
from corporate bonds towards CDS. Credit Spread research reports the following
results for long-term maturity spreads (3-10 years):
• Stylised Facts
[D¨ ullmann et al., 2000] and [Kao, 2000] ﬁnd that spreads are highly volatile.
The volatility is decreasing in credit quality. [Duﬃe and Singleton, 2003]
found that corporate bond spreads are autocorrelated (show persistence). The
question whether spreads exhibit mean-reversion (negative relation between
change and level) is still pending: studies using corporate bond indices usu-
ally report mean-reversion ([v. Landschoot, 2004], [Bhanot, 2005]). However,
[Bierens et al., 2003] does not ﬁnd evidence for mean reversion on a bond port-
folio level.
• Pricing
Concerning the pricing of credit risk, two model families have been developed:
structural and reduced-form models. Structural models determine the credit
spread based on market- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk factors. Reduced-form models
use unobservable, statistic variables to model the default event.
Although the ﬁrst structural model ([Merton, 1974]) failed to reproduce market
credit spreads1, advanced structural models incorporating stochastic interest
rates, endogenous default boundaries and/ or ﬁrm value jumps do replicate CDS-
spreads.2 Reduced-form models are not used to price spreads, but are calibrated
against (CDS-)spreads. They are rather used to extract implied spread dynamic
parameters.
• Determinants
The research stream ’Determinants’ seeks to corroborate whether credit spreads
(changes) are sensitive to the model risk factors (changes).
– Merton Factors
The relation (signiﬁcance, sign) between Merton74-factors and Corporate
Credit Spreads has empirically been corroborated:
spread (- Firm returns, + Firm volatility, - IR-level, - IR-slope, + leverage)
– Additional Factors
Merton76-implied factors leave a substantial fraction of corporate bonds
credit spread changes unexplained. Factors accounting for credit jump risk,
1Basic structural models overpredict in general or overpredict ’low’, but underpredict high-quality
bond spreads.
2[Ericsson et al., 2006] used the [Fan and Sundaresan, 2000]-model and reported a good general
matching of model-CDS and market CDS-premia. [Huang and Huang, 2003] report good calibration
results for several models.
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market liquidity and taxes added substantial explanatory power. These
factors have to be incorporated by models as well. However, default risk
accounts for the largest part of corporate bond credit spreads and is in-
creasing in both absolute and relative terms the lower the rating.
However, THE ’Credit spread’ does not exist. The ’Credit spread’ is not an one-
dimensional concept that represents a 1:1-link between the credit risk and its com-
pensation. In fact, credit spreads behave diﬀerently depending on ...
• Instruments (CDS-premia vs. Corporate Bond Spreads)
• Credit quality (Low vs. high credit quality)
• Maturity (short- vs. long-term spreads)
• Industry (bank vs. non-bank spreads)
• Size (small vs. large debtors)
Our paper studies the dynamic of short- and long-term CDS-spreads of banks. Our
study is inspired by [Covitz and Downing, 2007] which studied short-term Commer-
cial Paper and long-term Corporate Bond spreads. According to our literature classi-
ﬁcation, they report the following ﬁndings for a sample of around 2.000 non-ﬁnancial
US-corporates covering CP- and bond spreads from 01/1998 to 12/2001:
Stylised Facts
• Short-term spreads are sizable
Zero spreads do not exist: even the highest rated ﬁrms (AAA-long-term rated)
pay on the shortest maturity (Overnight) on average 10 BP. This increases up
to 34 BP for BBB (long-term rated) ﬁrms.
• Negative Correlation between short-term (Commercial Papers) and long-term
spreads (Corporate Bonds)
Short- and long-term spreads are not perfectly correlated. In some periods, they
even evolve in opposite directions. The analysis was performed cross-sectional
in order to obtain a distribution of correlations across ﬁrms.
Determinants
• Short-term CP spreads are driven by both insolvency and liquidity risk.
• Long-term bond spreads are only sensitive to insolvency risk.
• In times of distressed CP-markets corporates’ liquidity risk becomes more im-
portant for short-term spreads than for long-term spreads.
Although inspired by [Covitz and Downing, 2007], our paper contributes new aspects
to the literature as we choose CDS-spreads instead of CP-/ corporate bond spreads.
We choose CDS-spreads as they are considered to be pure default risk premia with-
out signiﬁcant market liquidity biases. Our short-term spreads are of 6M-maturity.
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As long-term CDS-spreads we choose 5Y. As our spreads result from the same asset
class, we hope to exclude any instrument-induced bias. The disadvantage is that the
shortest CDS-spreads are 6M instead of overnight or weekly CP-spreads as studied
by [Covitz and Downing, 2007].
[Covitz and Downing, 2007] studied corporate credit spreads. We study CDS-spreads
of banks. We consider banks an interesting industry as they are usually excluded in
default risk studies due to their particular capital structure. Furthermore, we believe
that the liquidity-sensitivity of short-term spreads is more pronounced with banks
as they have more cash ﬂow risk due to liquidity options and they do not have any
freedom to renegotiate the maturity of payment obligations.
According to the literature classiﬁcation, we study ’Stylised Facts’ and ’Determinants’
of CDS-spreads. We proceed as follows:
1. Stylised Facts
We study deltas and correlation between 6M- and 5Y-spreads on the index- and
on the bank-level. We particularly analyse the correlation for diﬀerent time
windows and market circumstances.
2. Determinants
We seek to identify factors that drive short- and/ or long-term CDS-spreads.
Particularly, we test whether short-term spreads are more liquidity-sensitive
than long-term spreads.
Our paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes our spread data and how
we designed our sample. Section 3 discusses the individual and common dynamics of
short- and long-term spreads. Section 4 tests for factors that are eligible to drive CDS-
spreads. In particular, we follow the idea of [Covitz and Downing, 2007] focussing on
insolvency and liquidity factors. Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook for further
research.
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2 Data and Sample Design
2.1 Data
We obtain daily CDS-quotes of 3068 entities from Markit covering the period from
01.01.2001 to 31.12.2007.
2.1.1 Sample Design
To obtain our ﬁnal sample, we apply a 4-stage ﬁlter:
1. Entities
As we focus on banks, we ﬁlter for ’Financials’. In order to ensure currency
homogeneity, we ﬁlter for ’EUR’-denominated CDS. This leaves us with 400
entities.
2. CDS-liquidity
Our paper studies the dynamics of short-term versus long-term CDS-spreads.
As short-term maturity we choose 6M as it is the shortest maturity available.
Among the long-term available maturities (5Y, 7Y, 10Y), we choose 5Y as it
is the most liquid segment by far. While the 5Y-segment has almost daily
observations, many entities only have sporadic observations in the 6M-segment.
Indeed, the long-term CDS-market is of a much larger size than the short-term
one as ﬁgure 1 demonstrates: the market segment of up to 1Y is fairly small
(about 7% of total market size) compared to the 5Y-segment (about 65% of total
market size).3 Therefore, 6M-CDS-liquidity is our ’bottleneck’ and deserves
particular attention. In order to identify the entities with the highest trading
activities in the 6M-segment, we proceed as follows: ﬁrst, we select those entities
that have 6M-spreads on 14.08.2007 and 11.04.2007. 2007 is a year with a fairly
good data coverage in the 6M-segment (our ﬁnal sample has 65% compared to
25% in 2003). We assume that only entities with 6M-spreads on two random
days in 2007, are actively traded entities eligible for our sample. This random
ﬁlter leaves us with 259 entities. In the next round, we order entities according
to the number of brokers that contributed to the 5Y-Markit-average quote. The
contributor ﬁeld seems to be a good liquidity proxy as our ﬁrst 29 entities
have been frequent iTRAXX-ﬁnancial-members (5Y-index of most liquid CDS
of ﬁnancials) in the last 7 tranches (2004 till ﬁrst tranche of 2007).4 From the
ordered list, we drop insurances and small entities leaving us with the ﬁnal
sample of 58 entities.
3. Time window
Our original time series cover the window 01.01.2001 - 31.12.2007. However,
not every entity has spreads for all the years. Indeed, ﬁgure 2 shows that
3Unfortunately, data prior to December 2004 are not available.
4This approach suﬀers from two shortcomings: ﬁrst, the number of contributors is a liquidity
proxy for 5Y, not for 6M. Therefore, the approach assumes that an actively traded 5Y-entity is also
an actively traded 6M-entity. Second, the iTRAXX-crosscheck only revealed a high correlation for
entities with the highest number of contributors. We do not know whether the ﬁeld is still reliable
for the non-iTRAXX-members. However, this is what we implicitly assume.
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Figure 1: Evolution of CDS-market (Source: Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics, BIS)
only 18% have a (full) history of 7 years. 65% have a history of 6 years or
longer. It can be seen that the year 2003 is a ’key year’ as it saw the last
signiﬁcant entrance of entities (the percentage of entities increased from 65%
(2002-2007) to 90% (2003-2007)). Therefore, we ﬁx the starting year to 2003
and drop the 6 entities with spread histories starting in 2004 or later.5 Now,
100% of our banks have at least one 6M-spread in 2003. However, we have to
ask ourselves how frequent the observations are in 2003? 2003 has a poor data
coverage of only 25%. Figure 3 plots the time series of 6M- and 5Y-spreads
across 2003: the 6M-segment starts the year with rather sporadic observations
suggesting little trading activity. Observations become more frequent towards
the end of the year. By contrast, the 5Y-series oﬀers complete data coverage
over the whole of 2003. Due to the poor data information in 2003, the impact of
outliers is tremendous: if series are averaged, the lack of observations increase
the impact of an outlier. This is highlighted in ﬁgure 4. ’Cap One Bank’ has
sporadic extreme spreads in the 6M-segment (up to 500 BP). It has the lowest
rating in our sample (BBB in 2003), but this hardly justiﬁes such high 6M-
spreads. Together with the series of ’Capital One Bank’, ﬁgure 4 also plots the
average with and without ’Capital One Bank’. It is obvious, that ’Capital One
Bank’ signiﬁcantly biases the 6M-average. Favorable to the bias is the low data
coverage in 2003 in the 6M-segment. The presumption that 25% data coverage
in 2003 is not suﬃcient, has been conﬁrmed. We therefore drop 2003 and restrict
our sample to observations from 01.01.2004 onwards.
5We drop HSBC Fin Corp (2004), JPMorgan Chase & Co (2004), Bk of America Corp (2006),
CAPITALIA S PER AZIONI (2006), NATIXIS (2006), Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (2007)
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Figure 2: % of banks whose spread series start in ...

















Figure 3: 6M-Times Series in 2003















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cap One Bank 
Average, All 
Average, All ./. Cap One 
Figure 4: Capital One Bank and Averages
As the data coverage increases, the impact of single time series on the averages
are reduced. This is documented in ﬁgure 5. While the average in 2003 is
dominated by ’Capital One Bank’ in the 6M-segment, the impact of the bank
vanishes with the years (although, ’Capital One Bank’ is still an outlier to some
extend due to its low rating). As the 5Y-segment has a better data quality, the
impact of ’Capital One Bank’ is much smaller. During 2003, there is a small
bias that vanishes during the years.
4. Seniority
CDS diﬀer according to their Seniority level. To ensure heterogenity, we restrict
the sample to the Seniority with the best data quality. Plotting the absolute
number of spread observations per seniority level across time leads to ﬁgure
6.6 We state that ’SNRFOR’ has slightly more observations (about 10%) than
’SUBLT2’. However, there is a convergence tendency as the diﬀerences in 2007
seem to narrow. The absolute number of observations could be due to large
segments. Therefore, we also check the relative data coverage. Figure 7 shows
the data quality within the 6M-maturity. Is suggests that ’Senior’ (max. 96%)
has a better data coverage than ’Subordinated’ (max. 82%).
Figure 8 displays the data quality within the 5Y-segment. We do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the relative data coverage between ’Senior’ and ’Sub-
ordinated’: ’Senior’ reaches 100% in 2006 and is slightly below 100% in 2007.
6We summarized all other seniorites under ’Others’.















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
6M−Spread, All 
6M−Spread, All ./. Cap One 
5Y−Spread, All 
5Y−Spread, All ./. Cap One 
Figure 5: Averaged Spreads with and without Capital One Bank










































Figure 6: Observations grouped by Seniority
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’Subordinated’ reaches 100% in 2007 and is slightly below in 2006.
We choose ’Senior’ as it has the highest absolute number of observations and
the highest relative data coverage in the 6M-segment.








































Figure 7: Data Coverage of the 6M-segment per Seniority Level
Our ﬁnal sample consists of ’senior’ spreads of 58 banks, covering the period from
01.01.2004 to 31.12.2007.
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Figure 8: Data Coverage of the 5Y-segment per Seniority Level
3 Stylised Facts
3.1 Time Series of Credit Spreads
We start with an analysis of the averages of 6M- and 5Y-spreads across banks. In the







t,N = 58 (1)
The index-time series are plotted in ﬁgure 9. Concerning the level, ﬁgure 9 documents
that the 5Y-index is above the 6M-index. Concerning the evolution, the spread volatil-
ity was fairly low from 2004 to mid-2007. From mid-2007 onwards, level and volatility
increased sharply during the subprime turmoils. Figure 9 suggests that the spreads
of both maturities are mainly driven by a common factor as they move very harmon-
ically. This is conﬁrmed by the correlation that amounts to 97% for the total period.
However, we are interested in the question whether the correlation is stable across
time.
Plotting the 7-day correlation across time leads to ﬁgure 10. Figure 10 conﬁrms
that the correlation is not stable and that there are periods of positive and neg-
ative correlation. The phenomenon of negative correlations has been reported by
[Covitz and Downing, 2007] and [Krishnan et al., 2006]7. The correlation in our sam-
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6M−Average 
5Y−Average 
Figure 9: Average Spreads of 6M- and 5Y-maturity
ple varies between -90% up to 99%. [Covitz and Downing, 2007] also report that
negative correlation is most pronounced in times of credit market disruptions. Figure
11 plots the correlation against the volatility of the 6M-spread. During the time frame
[2004, 2007] we see low and high volatility periods. The low volatility period leads
to the point concentration close to the Y-axis. Clearly, in a low volatility period, all
correlations are possible. The correlation is between -0.90% and + 99.45%. However,
in a high volatility period, only high positive correlation is observable. This suggests
that in calm markets, CDS-spreads are rather independent. They might be driven by
ideosyncratic shocks. However, in turbulent markets, our result for CDS-spreads is
diﬀerent to that of [Covitz and Downing, 2007]: CDS-spreads are highly correlated if
spreads show a high amount of activity. In turbulent markets, they are likely to be
driven by one common factor. Negative correlation implies that spreads change into
the opposite direction. As we report negative correlation for rather calm markets, we
are interested in the question if the spread changes with opposite signs are of signiﬁ-
cant size or rather ’noise’?
To answer this question, we use a scatter plot of spread deltas. Perfect correlation
implies that only the ﬁrst (+,+) or the third quadrant (-,-) contains observations.
Correlation smaller than one results in spread deltas in the second (-,+) and fourth
(+,-) quadrant.
Figure 12 documents indeed that all four quadrants contain observations. The (+,+)-
quadrant contains the majority of observations (40.3%). Already second (26.7%) is
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Figure 11: Correlation against Volatility
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increases of the 6M-spread. Third comes the (-,-)-quadrant (19.8%). By contrast, in
only 13.2% of the observations, the 5Y-spread increases whereas the 6M-spread de-
creases. We conclude that in 39.9%, spreads move into diﬀerent directions, whereas it
is more pronounced that the 6M-spread increase, but the 5Y-spread does not (26.7%)
than the other way round. However, there is a huge bulk of observations close to the
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Figure 12: Delta Plot on Bank Level
(0,0)-centre, indicating that both spreads do not move substantially. We believe that
these small movements are not due to fundamental changes in the driving factors, but
rather due to market liquidity or data error (MarkIt-spreads are averages!). There-
fore we eliminate all observations where both deltas are below a relevance boundary
of 10%. Our ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 13. If we restrict the sample to consid-
erable spread movements, ﬁgure 13 shows that only every ﬁfth observation (19.1%) is
left. Comparing the relative changes within the quadrants, one observes that ﬁrst and
second quadrant have relatively more small deltas than the third and fourth quadrant,
as both quadrants loose observations by the relevance restriction (-7.5% and -5.8%).
6M-spread decreases (3rd and 4th quadrant) are however more likely to be of larger
size than the increases (1st and 2nd quadrant). Nevertheless, the large movements
are more in the (-,-)-quadrant, i.e. spread falls are relatively large. Are spreads sub-
stantially more volatile during subprime (>1.7.2007) than before? Figures 14 and
15 plot the standard deviation of 6M- and 5Y-spreads of each bank before (X-axis)
and during the subprime turmoils (Y-axis). If the volatility remains the same, all
volatility pairs would be situated on the diagonal. As the majority of observations lie
above the diagonal, the volatility during subprime is substantially higher than before.
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% of total: 19.07%
Figure 13: Delta Plot on Bank Level
Standard Deviation of 6M−Spreads







































































 (8/162), (5/60), (5/60), 
 (13/45), (4/45), (4/30)
Figure 14: Standard Deviation of 6M-Spreads Before (X) and During (Y) Subprime
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Standard Deviation of 5Y−Spreads








































































Figure 15: Standard Deviation of 5Y-Spreads Before (X) and During (Y) Subprime
This holds for 6M-and 5Y-spreads. In order to facilitate the reading, we restrict the
graphics to 20 (6M) and 40 (5Y). Thus, we exclude 6 observations in the 6M- and 2
observations in the 5 year-plot.
Based on the higher volatility, it is worth to have a look at whether or not subprime
spread deltas behave diﬀerently to spread deltas before suprime. For that reason,
we split up the sample into ’before’ and ’during’ subprime and redo the delta plots.
Figure 16 displays the delta plot of subprime-observations. The quadrant distribu-
tion states that there are minor changes compared to the overall delta plot. Within
subprime, there are less observations of an increasing 6M-spread that is accompanied
with a decrease in 5Y-spreads (2nd quadrant: -5.4%). Does the delta size change com-
pared to the overall delta plot? For this purpose, we eliminate observations where
both deltas are smaller than 10%. Thus, we obtain ﬁgure 17. Figure 17 displays the
relevant deltas (≥ 10%) for each quadrant. For comparison, the ﬁgures of relevant
deltas on the total sample are given in parantheses. The ﬁrst observation is that
during subprime, the proportion of relevant observations (36.35%) is higher than on
the total sample (19.07%). During subprime, the relevant deltas in (+,+) have in-
creased. This is in line with a general increase of spreads during subprime. All other
quadrants of the subprime subset exhibit less relevant deltas than the overall sample,
whereas the reduction in the (-5Y,+6M)-quadrant and (-,-)-quadrant is substantial.
This particularly implies that the negative correlation of the (-5Y,+6M)-quadrant
results rather from the period ’before subprime’ than ’during subprime’.
To summarize, we can report the following ’Stylised Facts’:
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Figure 16: Delta Plot on Bank Level
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% of total: 36.35%
(19.07%)
Figure 17: Delta Plot on Bank Level, Subsample: Subprime
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On the index-level, we make the following observations:
• 5Y-spreads are higher than 6M-spreads.
• The correlation for the total period is 0.97.
• The 7-day correlation varies between -90% and 99%.
• High volatiltiy goes together with high correlation.
On the bank-level, we report the following ﬁndings:
• 39.9% of 5Y- and 6M-spread deltas have opposite signs which is inconsistent
with standard credit risk models. Restricting the deltas to ’signiﬁcant’ deltas
(≤ 10%) only leaves 19%. However, among these deltas there are 39.1% delta
pairs with opposite signs.
• Restricting the sample to the ’subprime observations’, there are slightly less
pairs with opposite signs (-2,6%). Taking into account the size of spread deltas,
we report that the deltas in the subprime window are higher. However, the
proportion of pairs with opposite signs is lower than for the total period.
The analysis suggests that during turbulent markets, spreads move more systemati-
cally than in calm markets. This result sharply contrasts [Covitz and Downing, 2007]
who found negative correlation most pronounced in turbulent markets. However, we
do not ﬁnd perfect correlation either. That is why we study potential factors that
determine CDS-spreads in the next section. As there is no perfect correlation between
short- and long-term spreads, we hypothesize that short- and long-term spreads might
be driven by diﬀerent factors. According to [Covitz and Downing, 2007], we test for
liquidity and insolvency factors.
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4 Determinants of CDS-Spreads
4.1 Factor Classiﬁcation and Approaches
Factors can be grouped economically into systematic/ unsystematic and insolvency/
illiquidity factors. Systematic factors are factors that are the same for every bank. In
general, these are market prices. Bank-speciﬁc factors vary across banks.
Apart from an economic classiﬁcation, we technically distinguish high- and low fre-
quency factors. We call factors with daily observations ’high frequency’ and factors
with any other frequencies (monthly, quarterly and annual data) ’low frequency’ fac-
tors. According to this classiﬁcation scheme, ﬁgure 18 summarizes our factors. Using
Figure 18: Factor Classiﬁcation
factors of diﬀerent frequencies pose the problem, of how to harmonize the frequency:
use only selected time points of the high-frequency factors (and ignore many observa-
tions) or to extrapolate low-frequency data to unobserved time points? Or combine
both approaches using a ’middle’ frequency?
Our factor set does not allow for a natural distinction such as: all systematic factors
are of a low, all bank-speciﬁc factors are of a high frequency. Also the distinction
between illiquidity and insolvency factors is not helpful: they are of low and high-
frequency.
As the frequency itself is at the origin of those problems, we decide to make a cut
between low- and high-frequency factors: high-frequency factors are used in time se-
ries regressions whereas low frequency factors are used in cross-sectional regressions.
A panel approach would be technically possible, but involves the above mentioned
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’compromise’ frequency.
Using cross-sectional regressions, we are in line with [Covitz and Downing, 2007].
However, instead of quarterly regressions, we perform annual regressions due to data
constraints. By contrast, [Covitz and Downing, 2007] did ot perform time series re-
gressions. The next section is dedicated to the time series approach.
4.2 Time Series Regressions
4.2.1 Factor Description
Figure 19 summarizes factors, sources and expected signs for Time Series Regres-
sions. In the following, we describe the factors and substantiate their impact on
Figure 19: Factors used in Time Series Regressions
CDS-spreads.
Illiquidity Factors As systematic proxies for liquidity we use variables of the Eu-
ropean Money and Central Bank Market. Money Market data are obtained from
Reuters. Central Bank data are obtained from the European Central Bank. High fre-
quency bank-speciﬁc liquidity proxies would be information based on banks’ internal
liquidity models. We did not have access to such information. Therefore, we cannot
test for bank-speciﬁc high-frequency illiquidity factors.
In the following, we explain the expected signs of the factors.
• Bid-Ask Spreads of 3M-Deposits
The bid-ask spread is a measure for market liquidity. Its size is related to the
mismatch of supply and demand. As maturity we choose 3M, as 3M is considered
to be ’middle term’ in the Money Market. In fact, ECB-tenders with 3M-term
are already considered ’long-term’. We hypothesize that a higher spread reﬂects
that banks ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to borrow 3M. Accordingly, a higher bid-ask
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spread would increase the illiquidity risk and lead to higher short-term spreads
(expected sign: +).
• Euribor-Eurepo-Spread (1M)
Euribor is a Money Market index for unsecured, Eurepo for secured funding.
Euribor/Eurepo-Spread is also used by the ECB to monitor the conditions on
the Money Market and to decide about interventions.8 We hypothesize that
less conﬁdence in the Money Market leads to signiﬁcantly higher premia for
unsecured, but only moderately higher premia for secured funding. Therefore,
tightened Money Market conditions should lead to a higher Euribor-/Eurepo-
spread and higher short-term CDS-spreads (expected sign: +).
• ON-spread
The ON-spread is the bid-ask spread for the shortest maturity available. The
same arguments as for the 3M-spread apply. However, ’overnight’ is the short-
term maturity of the Money Market segment. We expect a positive sign.
• Swap-/Government Spread
The Swap-/Government spread measures the diﬀerence between funded and un-
funded interest rates. We hypothesize that swaps are less sensitive to money
market conditions, as no liquidity is needed for their origination. By con-
trast, the yield for Government securities is derived from bonds that involve
liquidity at the origination. We calculate the spread as 1Y-swap rate minus
1Y-government yield. We hypothesize that a worsening of liquidity conditions
lead to higher bond prices, implying lower yields. Raising this argument, swap
rates reﬂect pure interest rate, government yields interest and liquidity condi-
tions. Therefore, a worsening of liquidity conditions leads to a higher Swap-
/Government spread. The expected sign is positive.
• ECB-Tender (Amount)
Our starting point is the oﬃcial tender ﬁle of the ECB that contains all tenders,
i.e. of all types (Liquidity Absorbing/ Providing, Regular/ Quick-Tenders) and
all maturities (ON-, 1W, 3M).9 In order to eliminate any expected elements,
we exclude regular tenders but only keep quick tenders that are unexpected by
banks. Absorbing tenders are ﬂagged ’-’, providing tenders are ﬂagged ’+’. We
hypothesize that large providing quick tenders improve market conditions and
should lead to lower CDS-spreads. Hence, we expect a negative sign.
• ECB-Tender (Number of Bidders)
We use the number of bidders as a proxy for the need of liquidity. For ﬁxed
volume tenders, only the tender rate can proxy the need for liquidity. We
hypothesize that the number of bidders is an indication for the need to access
central bank money. Analogously to the amount, we ﬂag the number of bidders
of providing tenders by ’+’, of absorbing tenders by ’-’. We expect a negative
sign.
8See [European Central Bank, 2007a, p. 30]. Unfortunately, we could not access other variables
monitored by ECB as EONIA-volume and ON-rates ( [European Central Bank, 2007b, p. 25ﬀ.]).
EONIA-Swap rates were accessible but only had a history of 18 months.
9For tender information and deﬁnitions, see [European Central Bank, 2006, p.8]
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Insolvency Factors Our insolvency factors are inspired by the traditional ’Merton’-
model.10:
• Firm Value
We proxy the ﬁrm value by the stock price. It is a bank-speciﬁc insolvency factor.
Higher stock prices go along with lower CDS-spreads, implying an expected
negative sign.
• Volatility of Firm Value
We proxy the volatility of ﬁrm value by the implied stock price volatility. As we
do not have access to time series of implied volatilities for individual stocks, we
use EUROSTOXX-implied volatilities instead. Our factor is a systematic one.
The expected sign is positive.
• Interest Rate-level
The Merton model predicts that higher interest rates lead to lower credit
spreads. We use the 10y-EUR swap rate as proxy for the interest rate level.
The expected sign is negative.
The Merton model also evokes the ’leverage’. Our sample contains the leverage, but
as a low frequency factor. Hence, it is included in cross-sectional regressions.
We also apply the traded stock volume as proxy for investor’s nervosity.
The factor ’Stock Price’ is a bottleneck in our analysis as some banks do not have
publicly traded stocks. For other banks, we do not have complete data between
1.1.2004-31.12.2007. Table B in the appendix documents the stock price availability.







• Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA
Due to the exclusion, we can only perform 41 time series-regressions.
4.3 Stationarity
In order to avoid spurious regressions, we have to check whether spread and factors
series are stationary. We ﬁrst discuss the stationarity of CDS-spreads.
10See [Merton, 1974].
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4.3.1 CDS-Spreads
Figure 20 shows the distribution of the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller statistic for several
setups (original series, Diﬀ(), Log(), DiﬀLog(), Original/NoSubprime, Original/Sub-
prime). Diﬀ() stands for the delta-, log() for the log- and diﬄog() for the log-return
transformation of the original series. NoSubprime and Subprime split up the sample
into spreads before (NoSubprime) and after 01.07.2007 (Subprime).
The critical value for the ADF-statistic is -3.9611. It is given as red cut-oﬀ-line in





















































































































Figure 20: Results of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test for several setups
be stationary at the 1%-error level.
Figure 20 clearly shows that the original spread series are non-stationary. Also, taking
the logs does not de-trend them. However, taking diﬀerences or log-returns leads to
11See [Gujarati, 2003, p.975].
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stationary series.12 The split up into ’No subprime’ and ’Subprime’ does not lead to
stationary series either. Especially the distribution of the subprime-observations are
far from being stationary.13
We conclude that we have to use diﬀ() or log-returns to operate with stationary spread
series.
4.3.2 Factors
The same stationarity analyses as for spreads have to be performed for the factors as
well. We start with the stationarity of systematic factors.
Systematic Factors The stationarity results for systematic factors are summarized
in ﬁgure 21. Figure 21 is grouped by factors. For each factor, the stationarity of six
setups (orginal, diﬀ-, logreturn- and NoSubprime/Subprime-series) is analysed. The
cut-oﬀ-value is plotted as line. However, as the ECB-series (Amount, Bidder) con-
tain ’zeros’, we cannot use log()- nor diﬄog()-transformation. Their adf-result is set
to zero. For the IMF-series (GDP, UMP, CPI) and BIS-Housing Prices, the sample
split up into NoSubprime/ Subprime failed as there are no value updates during the
’Subprime’-window and the adf-test does not work on a constant. These respective
adf-results are also set to zero.
Figure 21 suggests that only the orginal series of ON-Spread and ECB-Tender (Bid-
ders) are likely to be stationary (at a 1%-level). Somewhat surprising is the non-
stationarity of 10Y-swap rates, as interest rates are largely assumed to be mean-
reverting, i.e. to have a constant long-term mean. One possible explanation for that
observation might be our rather short-term time series of 4 years.
Figure 21 also proposes ways to make series stationary: diﬀ()- and diﬄog()-
transformations always lead to stationary series. The split up into NoSubprime/
Subprime-window results in a stationary NoSubprime-series, but often the subprime-
part is still non-stationary.
We conclude that we can use the original series of ’ON-spread’ and ’ECB-Tender
(Bidders)’. All other series have to be made stationary by taking diﬀ().
Bank-speciﬁc Factors The stationarity of bank-speciﬁc factors has to be checked
for every bank. We use ’Stock Price’ and ’Traded Volume’ as bank-speciﬁc factors
in our time series regressions. Figure 2214 conﬁrms that stock price series are not
stationary: the red cut-oﬀ line for the critical value (-3.96) is not even plotted for the
’Original’ series as the ADF-values for all banks are lower. Taking ’logs ’ or splitting
up the models into ’NoSubprime’/’Subprime’ does not make the series stationary
either. However, by taking diﬀ() or diﬀ(log()) we obtain stationary series.
In contrast to stock prices, the ’Traded Stock Volume’ is already stationary as ﬁgure
23 suggests. We conclude that the ’Stock Price’-series have to be ’delta’-ed. ’Traded
Stock Volume’ can be used in its original form.
12Taking diﬀerences does not lead to a stationary serie for one bank.
13The sample split up reduces the number of observations. As the critical value depends on this
quantity, a higher critical value applies to the sub-sample. This underlines that the sub-sample
’Subprime’ is not stationary.
14Due to lacking data, no ADF-test could be performed for ’Barclays Bk plc’.
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ADF−Test Statistic
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Figure 21: Results of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test for Systematic Factors




































































Figure 22: Results of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test for Factor ’Stock Price (N=40’)







































Figure 23: Results of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Test for Factor ’Traded Stock Volume’
4.3.3 Results
The time series regressions estimate the following econometric model for 6M and 5Y
respectively:
∆ci
t = β0 + β1 · ∆(Euribor-/Eurepo-Spread)
i
t
+ β1 · Stock-Volumei
t + β2 · ECB-Tender (Bidders)
i
t
+ β3 · ON-Spreadi + β4 · ∆3M-Spreadi
t
+ β5 · ECB-Tender (Amount)
i
t + β6 · 1t∈TSubprime
+ β7 · ∆(Stock Price)
i
t + β8 · ∆(1Y-Swap-/Gov-Spread)
i
t
+ β9 · ∆(EUROSTOXX)
i




t,∀i=1,...,41, t = 1.1.2004, ..., 31.12.2007
For the 41 regressions, we obtain a distribution of R2 that is displayed in ﬁgure 24.
The R2s of the 5Y-segment are higher than of the 6M-segment: in the 6M-segment,
there are only a few regressions beyond 10% R2. By contrast, the 5Y-segment sees
many regressions beyond 10%. The maximal R2 in the 5Y-segment is 61%. For the
6M-segment, the best regression hardly reaches 30%. However, we can document
that the R2s are fairly small, indicating that our factor set is unlikely to contain all
factors. Drilling down on the factor level, we obtain the t-value distribution as shown
in ﬁgure 25. In general we can state that we do not observe signiﬁcant factors in the
6M-segment: the t-values oscillate around zero indicating that 6M-spreads are almost
insensitive to our factors. This statement holds for both insolvency and illiquidity
factors. By contrast, we ﬁnd the four Merton-factors signiﬁcant and with a consistent
sign for 5Y-spreads:
• EUROSTOXX-Volatility
The positive relation between the volatility and the spread is signiﬁcant for


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 25: t-Values of Time Series Regressions
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almost all regressions. Even the lowest t-values are still signiﬁcant.
• Stock Price
The majority of regressions show the negative relation between stock price and
5Y-spread. However, some regressions also have positive (insigniﬁcant) values.
• 10Y-Swap Rate
We corroborate the negative relation. Analogously to stock prices, the majority
of regressions have signiﬁcant negative t-values. However, some regressions have
small (insigniﬁcant) positive t-values.
• Subprime-Dummy
Almost 50% of the regressions have a signiﬁcant positive subprime dummy.
This indicates that the subprime window has higher spreads that have not been
explained by other factors.
The following statements summarize the ﬁndings of our time series regressions:
1. For the 5Y-segment, we conﬁrm signs and signiﬁcance of Merton factors (Stock
Volatiltiy, Stock Price, Interest Rate). Furthermore, we conﬁrm that the 5Y-
segment is not sensitive to liquidity factors.
2. For the 6M-segment, none of our factors is signiﬁcant. The fact that the Merton-
factors are not signiﬁcant either is an indication, that 6M-spreads are driven by
other factors. Though we cannot say by which factors. None of our liquidity
factors showed a signiﬁcant response.
The following section discusses the robustness of our results by testing the OLS-
assumptions.
4.3.4 Testing of OLS-Assumptions
Heteroscedasticity To test for heteroscedasticity, we use the Goldfeld-Quandt and
the Breusch-Pagan test. For a conﬁdence level of 1%, the critical values are 1,36 and
23,3115, respectively. Figure 26 and 27 summarize 41 test statistics. The critical
values are plotted as line. Both tests suggest that homoscedasticity can be rejected
on a 1% error level: 90% of the Breusch-Pagan test statistics are beyond the critical
value (see ﬁgure 27). The Goldfeld-Quandt test does not have any observations below
the critical value. A consequence of heteroscedasticity is that our t-values and R2s
are likely to be biased.
Autocorrelation of Residuals We applied the Breusch-Godfrey test for analysing
whether the residuals are correlated or not. Figure 28 summarizes the results of the
test. The critical value for the 1% level is 6.65 and is displayed as a red line. We
conclude that for 70% of the regressions the Breusch-Godfrey-value is beyond the
critical value. Hence, for the large majority, the assumption of uncorrelated residuals
has to be rejected. As a consequence, the reported t-values might be biased.
1511 factors, 99%-conﬁdence level











































Figure 26: GoldfeldQuandt, N = 41














































Figure 27: BreuschPagan, , N = 41












































Figure 28: BreuschGodfrey, N = 41
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4.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions
4.4.1 Factor Description
Figure 29: Factors used in Cross-Sectional Regressions
The factor set for cross-sectional regressions consists of balance sheet factors and one
rating factor. Due to their balance sheet and rating character, they are all bank-
speciﬁc. Systematic, low frequency factors are not at our disposal. We obtain balance
sheet information for 2004 to 2007 from BankScope. Long-term Ratings are obtained
from Fitch. Due to diﬀerent accounting schemes, we do not have observations for all
banks and all years. Table B in the appendix shows the distribution of observations
across factors and years. It also shows that the data coverage increases every year.
However, the coverage in 2004 is not suﬃcient to perform OLS-regressions. That is
why we drop this year. In the following, we establish and explain our factors starting
with the illiquidity factors.
Illiquidity Factors




The % of matched funding measures the liquidity mismatch between assets
and liabilities. Bank’s liquidity risk primarily stems from a liquidity mismatch
between assets and liabilities. A bank that only holds illiquid assets or only
liquid liabilities does not necessarily bear a liquidity risk. Only if the illiquid
assets are funded with liquid liabilities (and vice versa). Therefore, our factor
accounts for both sides taking into account assets and liabilities. The higher
the liquid asset proportion, the lower the liquidity risk and spread implying a
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negative sign. ’Liquid Assets’ and ’Short-term funding’ are already aggregated
positions.
We deﬁne ’Liquid Assets’ as:
LF = Government Securities
+ Trading Securities + Cash and Due from Banks
+ Due from Other Banks
We deﬁne ’Short-term Funding’ as:
SF = Customer Deposits + Banks Deposits
+ Total Money Market Funding
• % of Wholesale Funding (WF)
WF =
Total Money Market Funding
Total Liabilities
Our second liquidity factor is an exclusive liability factor. It measures the
percentage of wholesale funding on total funding and captures the stability of
the funding base. We argue that wholesale funding is more volatile than retail
funding. We use money market funding as a proxy for wholesale funding. We
expect that a high money market dependence leads to higher short-term CDS-
spreads (positive sign). Both positions ’Total Money Market Funding’ and ’Total
Liabilities’ are pre-deﬁned by BankScope.
With these factors, we are close to [Covitz and Downing, 2007] who test the following
factors in cross-sectional regressions:
1. (log) current assets - (log) current liabilites
2. (current assets - current liabilities)/asset volatility
3. (log) current assets - (log) total assets
[Kashyap et al., 2002] analyse the relation between liquidity options (demand deposits
and credit lines) and liquidity reserve. They approximate the liquidity reserve by the
sum of cash, securities and FED-funds sold, normalised by total assets.
Insolvency Factors
• Loan Loss Reserves [%]
Loan loss reserves measure the reserves for expected and unexpected credit
losses. They are accumulated across years. In order to de-level the series, we
standardize by ’Total Equity’. Higher reserves indicate a low credit quality of
banks’ assets and therefore higher spreads. Hence we expect a positive sign.
• Loan Loss Provision [%]
Loan loss provisions are the new loss reserves that only date from the reporting
year. We also standardize by ’Total Equity’. We expect a positive sign.
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• Tier 1-Capital Ratio
Tier1-Capital Ratio measures the ability of the bank to absorb (any) losses.
The higher the ratio, the higher the risk buﬀer and the lower the CDS-spreads.
Hence we expect a negative sign.
• % of Problem Loans
The volume of problem loans to total loans measures the credit quality of banks’
loan portfolios. However, it is not homogenous: it comprises problem loans
(that could default)/overdue loans (that have entered the default status) and
restructured loans (that are beyond default). We expect a positive sign.
• Pre-Tax-Proﬁt [%]
The Pre-Tax-Proﬁt measures the proﬁtability of the bank and thus also its
capacity to absorb losses. We standardize the proﬁt by ’Total Equity’. We
expect a negative sign.
• Leverage




The position ’Total Assets’ is an accounting position and not risk-weighted. We
use this factor to be in line with former studies. The higher the leverage, the
higher the default risk (c.p.). Hence we expect a positive sign.
• Long-term Rating
We linearly map ratings to values (’Rating Value’). Thus we neglect the fact
that default probabilities are not linearly increasing with the rating. We expect
a positive sign as a lower rating quality refers to a higher rating value, implying
a higher CDS-spread.
[Covitz and Downing, 2007] use the following insolvency factors:
1. (log) KMV-EDF
We could not access KMV-EDF. For robustness tests they also use:
1. (log) total assets/ total liabilities
2. (log) Interest rate coverage
3. long-term rating of each ﬁrm.
From these factors, we use the long-term rating.
The study of [Krishnan et al., 2006] raises the question if the slope of the credit spread
of corporate bonds predicts future bank (default) risk. From a sample of 50 ﬁrms
across 5 years, they proxy default risk with the following factors:
1. Return on Assets
2. Loans to Total Assets




From this factor set, we use % of Problem Loans (Problem loans/ Total Loans) and
Leverage.
4.4.2 Results
The stationarity issue from time series regression does not apply in the cross-sectional
setup. Therefore, all factors are regressed in their original form.
Cross-sectional regressions are performed across all banks for selected dates. The se-
lected time-points are preferably around the dates, that the low frequency data are
updated. We therefore use the ﬁrst observation in each January (2005, 2006, 2007)
as key dates. As our explained variables (6M- and 5Y-CDS spreads) are of a high
frequency, spreads on a particular key date might be exposed to a daily noise. In
order to smooth such noise away, we average spreads from 1.12.(t) till 31.1.(t+1) and
regress on these averages.
The cross-sectional regressions of 2005 (beginning of January 2005) and 2006 (begin-
ning of January 2006) across 41 entities lead to the t-values given in ﬁgure 30. We
make the following observations:
1. The t-Values of 2006 are larger than those of 2005.
Particularly, we do not have any signiﬁcant (99%-level) relation in 2005. By
contrast, in 2006 we have the following signiﬁcant relations:
6M-/5Y-Spread ∼ Long-Term Rating
6M-/5Y-Spread ∼ Loan Loss Reserves [%]
6M-Spread ∼ Problem Loans
5Y-Spread ∼ Loans Loss Provisions
These factors are all insolvency factors. These factors inﬂuence 6M-spreads as
well.
2. Small t-values have a tendency to have diﬀerent signs in 2005 and 2006.
This is true for ’Leverage’, ’Tier1-Ratio’, ’Pre-Tax-Proﬁt’ and ’Matched-
Funding’. An exception is ’Wholesale Funding’ where small t-values have con-
sistent signs in 2005 and 2006.
3. Large t-values have consistent signs
Large t-values usually have the same sign in 2005 and 2006 and for 6M- and
5Y-maturities.
4. Liquidity Factors do not have a signiﬁcant impact on either 6M- or 5Y-spreads.
Similar to time series regressions, we do not ﬁnd empirical support for the assumption
that 5Y-spreads are particularly sensitive to insolvency and 6M-spreads to illiquidity
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t−Values of Cross−Sectional Regressions
2005
2006
















Figure 30: t-Values of Cross-Sectional Regressions, N=41
384 DETERMINANTS OF CDS-SPREADS
factors. Insolvency factors have an impact on both maturities, whereas we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant impact of illiquidity factors on either maturity.
Concerning the R2, we obtain 56% (6M)/ 81,7% (5Y) for 2005 and 75,3% (6M)/
83,55% (5Y) for 2006. The higher R2 for 2006 is consistent with the better t-values.
However, the t-signiﬁcance does not seem to justify such high R2. Unfortunately, we
could not determine the reason of that phenomenon. We eliminated a possible level
bias16 by using ratios as explaining factors.
We also tested for multicollinearity calculating the pairwise factor correlations of 2006.
They are reported in table . We consider correlations of 60% and more as critical.
The reported correlations are however below that value. Furthermore, the correlation
of 2005 is similar, as the delta-correlation matrix of table 4.4.2 reveals.
MF WF LLR LLP T1 PL PTP LEV LTR
MF 1.00 0.45 −0.26 −0.26 0.29 0.06 0.05 0.28 −0.04
WF 0.45 1.00 −0.26 −0.04 0.23 0.06 0.14 0.23 −0.20
LLR −0.26 −0.26 1.00 0.17 −0.32 0.75 −0.29 0.00 0.28
LLP −0.26 −0.04 0.17 1.00 0.24 0.07 0.57 −0.34 0.30
T1 0.29 0.23 −0.32 0.24 1.00 −0.31 0.56 0.12 0.13
PL 0.06 0.06 0.75 0.07 −0.31 1.00 −0.45 0.05 0.25
PTP 0.05 0.14 −0.29 0.57 0.56 −0.45 1.00 −0.22 0.22
LEV 0.28 0.23 0.00 −0.34 0.12 0.05 −0.22 1.00 −0.38
LTR −0.04 −0.20 0.28 0.30 0.13 0.25 0.22 −0.38 1.00
Table 1: Correlation of Low-Frequency Factors, 2006(N=41)
MF WF LLR LLP T1 PL PTP LEV LTR
MF 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.07 −0.22 0.05 0.12 −0.16
WF 0.02 0.00 −0.17 0.15 0.02 0.01 −0.11 −0.09 −0.14
LLR 0.07 −0.17 0.00 −0.10 0.06 0.19 −0.05 −0.22 0.05
LLP 0.10 0.15 −0.10 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.24 −0.13 −0.09
T1 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 0.09 0.01
PL −0.22 0.01 0.19 0.08 −0.01 0.00 −0.08 −0.21 0.08
PTP 0.05 −0.11 −0.05 0.24 −0.04 −0.08 0.00 −0.18 0.20
LEV 0.12 −0.09 −0.22 −0.13 0.09 −0.21 −0.18 0.00 −0.11
LTR −0.16 −0.14 0.05 −0.09 0.01 0.08 0.20 −0.11 0.00
Table 2: Correlation-Deltas (2006-2005) of Low-Frequency Factors (N=41)
16A level bias occurs if absolute factors are used instead of relative ones. As CDS-spreads are a
sort of rate, factors should be rates or ratios as well.
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5 Conclusion
Our paper studied ’Stylised Facts’ and ’Determinants’ of short- and long-term CDS-
spreads of banks. We got inspired by a paper of [Covitz and Downing, 2007] that
studied short-term commercial paper and long-term bond spreads of non-ﬁnancial
companies.
Using short- and long-term spreads of the same asset class eliminates potential in-
strument biases. [Covitz and Downing, 2007] ﬁrst showed that short- and long-term
spreads are not perfectly correlated. They hypothesized that short-term spreads might
reﬂect illiquidity risk whereas long-term spreads rather reﬂect insolvency risk. As
banks bear a higher liquidity risk (higher cash ﬂow volatility due to products with
liquidity options and no re-negotiating of payment obligations), banks are a natural
choice to test for liquidity risk.
Using a sample of 58 banks with daily CDS-spreads covering the period 1.1.2004-
31.12.2007, we obtained the following ’Stylised Facts’:
• Short- and long-term spreads have a high correlation (97%) on the total period.
• Splitting up the total period into sub-periods, we obtain a wide spectrum of
correlations (-99% ... 99 %).
• In turbulent markets, spreads have a tendency to co-move. In calm markets,
they seem independent.
• In 39%, spreads went into diﬀerent directions. This result is robust, even if
small changes (≤ 10%) are excluded.
The second point corroborates the ﬁndings of [Covitz and Downing, 2007]. However,
the third point sharply contrasts them, as they report that negative correlation is
most pronounced in turbulent markets. We showed, that for CDS-spreads exactly the
opposite is the case.
Having shown that CDS-spreads are not always perfectly correlated, we tested for
potential determining factors in the section ’Determinants’. We split up our factor set
into (daily) high frequency and low frequency factors. High-frequency factors were
regressed in a time series-framework, whereas low frequency factors were regressed
cross-sectional for selected dates.
Prior to the time series regressions, we tested for spread and factor stationarity. We
found that the majority of series are non-stationary at the 1%-level. Therefore, we
used the delta-series in the regressions.
We ﬁnd empirical support for the following statements:
• 5Y-spreads are signiﬁcantly sensitive to Merton-insolvency factors (ﬁrm value
volatility, stock-price, interest rate level).
• 5Y-spreads are not sensitive to liquidity factors.
• 6M-spreads are neither sensitive to insolvency nor to illiquidity factors.
This ﬁnding suggest that 6M-spreads are (partly) driven by other factors than
5Y-spreads. However, none of our factors seems to signiﬁcantly explain 6M-
spreads.
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Testing for ’Homoscedasticity’ and ’Independence of Residuals’ revealed that
these assumptions were not fulﬁlled for our regressions. As a consequence, our
t-values and R2 are likely to be biased.
The majority of bank-speciﬁc factors were of low-frequency. In order to eliminate
any level bias, we transformed all balance sheet factors to ratios or rates. Due
to low data coverage, we had to exclude the 2004-values.
The cross-sectional regressions lead to the following results:
– The t-values of 2006 are larger than those of 2005.
Particularly, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant (99%-level) relation in 2005.
By contrast, for 2006 we found:
6M-/5Y-Spread ∼ Long-Term Rating
6M-/5Y-Spread ∼ Loan Loss Reserves [%]
6M-Spread ∼ Problem Loans
5Y-Spread ∼ Loans Loss Provisions
In contrast to our time series regressions, the cross-sectional regressions ﬁnd
some signiﬁcant factors for 6M-spreads. However, these relations are not ob-
servable for all years. The fact that relations can be found for 2006 might be due
to the better data quality for both balance sheet factors and 6M-CDS-spreads.
In line with the time series regressions, none of our liquidity factors is signiﬁcant
for either maturity. Hence, we cannot corroborate [Covitz and Downing, 2007]
who state that short-term spreads are also sensitive to liquidity factors whereas
5Y-spreads are not. We do not ﬁnd this 6M-sensitivity.
Our cross-sectional regressions show very high R2 that do not seem to be con-
sistent with the rather poor t-values. Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd the reason
for that phenomenon.
The imperfect correlation between short- and long-term factors can be eas-
ily shown. However, we did not ﬁnd any factor that signiﬁcantly drives 6M-
spreads. The 5Y-insolvency factors did not drive them either. Future research
should concentrate on identifying the factors behind short-term CDS-spreads.
This requirement does not only apply for empirical studies, but also for mod-
elling eﬀorts: credit risk models should describe short-term spreads by another
risk factor than long-term spreads. Distinguishing ’Jump-to-Default’-risk for
short-term and ’Credit Deterioration’ for long-term spreads are promising ways
to pursue. However, our research well integrates into the ’Jump-to-Default’-
philosophy as we tested whether the ’Jump-to-Default’ might be triggered by
liquidity risk. We cannot report any empirical evidence that short-term CDS-







2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007
ABN AMRO Bk N V 261 260 256 216 262 260 260 261
Allied Irish Bks PLC 229 259 260 222 262 260 260 261
Amern Express Co 256 260 260 247 262 260 260 261
Barclays Bk plc 261 249 260 248 262 260 260 261
Bay Landbk Giroz 153 257 260 214 259 260 260 261
Bca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S p A 255 257 252 248 262 260 260 261
Bca Naz del Lavoro S p A 243 258 259 253 262 260 260 261
Bca Pop di Milano Soc Coop a r l 213 256 260 255 262 260 260 261
Bco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S A 260 256 257 244 262 260 260 261
Bco Comercial Portugues SA 258 259 260 224 262 260 260 261
Bco Espirito Santo S A 259 258 260 243 262 260 260 261
Bco Santander Cen Hispano S A 262 257 260 169 262 260 260 169
Bk Austria Cred AG 210 206 242 30 262 260 260 261
BNP Paribas 257 260 244 156 262 260 260 261
Cap One Bk 260 219 240 244 262 260 260 261
CIT Gp Inc 257 256 259 261 262 260 260 261
Citigroup Inc 252 258 260 261 262 260 260 261
Commerzbank AG 260 260 257 242 262 260 260 261
Cr Agricole SA 142 220 252 170 262 260 260 261
Cr Suisse Gp 254 260 256 254 262 260 260 261
Deutsche Bk AG 262 260 260 260 262 260 260 261
Dresdner Bk AG 258 260 259 247 262 260 260 261
Erste Bk Der Ost Sparkassen AG 185 249 257 257 262 260 260 261
Fortis NV 229 240 258 261 262 260 260 261
Goldman Sachs Gp Inc 257 260 260 239 262 260 260 261
Gov & Co Bk Irlnd 206 232 257 260 262 260 260 261
Gov & Co Bk Scotland 242 250 246 166 262 260 260 185
HSBC Bk plc 262 252 243 197 262 260 260 261
HSBC Hldgs plc 202 204 244 35 262 260 260 261
ING Bk N V 260 260 244 169 262 260 260 261
KBC Bk 41 243 244 169 260 260 260 261
Landbk Hessen thueringen Giroz 15 170 250 258 255 247 260 261
Lehman Bros Hldgs Inc 261 260 260 252 262 260 260 261
Lloyds TSB Bk plc 256 250 248 197 262 260 260 261
Mediobanca SpA 201 258 259 254 262 260 260 261
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 257 258 260 259 262 260 260 261
Morgan Stanley 249 260 260 255 262 260 260 261
Nomura Secs Co Ltd 107 218 257 244 262 260 260 261
Nordea Bk Norge ASA 0 114 0 232 75 222 260 256
Q B E Ins Gp Ltd 29 255 250 246 262 260 260 261
Rabobank Nederland 252 258 245 201 262 260 260 261
Royal Bk Scotland plc 252 260 248 204 262 260 260 261
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 79 255 245 202 245 260 260 261
SNS Bk NV 227 257 259 246 262 260 260 261
Societe Generale 261 260 259 246 262 260 260 261
Std Chartered Bk 254 251 258 228 262 260 260 261
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 26 224 250 55 260 260 260 261
UBS AG 255 259 260 242 262 260 260 261
UniCredito Italiano S p A 259 258 260 185 262 260 260 195
Wachovia Corp 244 256 260 244 262 260 260 261
WestLB AG 174 256 244 187 262 260 260 261
Zurich Ins Co 259 256 258 248 262 260 260 261
Table 3: Number of Spread Observations for ’Stylised Facts’
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Bank 2004 2005 2006 2007
ABN AMRO Bk N V 257 257 255 252
Allied Irish Bks PLC 0 24 253 253
Amern Express Co 252 252 251 251
Barclays Bk plc 0 0 0 60
Bay Landbk Giroz 0 0 0 0
Bca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S p A 0 17 254 252
Bca Naz del Lavoro S p A 0 0 0 0
Bca Pop di Milano Soc Coop a r l 257 256 254 252
Bco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S A 251 256 254 253
Bco Comercial Portugues SA 0 0 254 255
Bco Espirito Santo S A 259 257 255 255
Bco Santander Cen Hispano S A 251 256 254 165
Bk Austria Cred AG 0 29 246 247
BNP Paribas 259 257 255 255
Cap One Bk 0 29 251 251
CIT Gp Inc 252 252 251 251
Citigroup Inc 252 252 251 251
Commerzbank AG 257 257 255 252
Cr Agricole SA 259 257 255 255
Cr Suisse Gp 0 1 250 252
Deutsche Bk AG 257 257 255 252
Dresdner Bk AG 0 0 0 0
Erste Bk Der Ost Sparkassen AG 0 0 242 247
Fortis NV 259 257 255 255
Goldman Sachs Gp Inc 252 252 251 251
Gov & Co Bk Irlnd 254 253 253 253
HSBC Bk plc 254 252 252 253
HSBC Hldgs plc 0 0 0 0
ING Bk N V 259 257 255 255
KBC Bk 259 257 255 255
Landbk Hessen thueringen Giroz 0 0 0 0
Lehman Bros Hldgs Inc 252 252 251 251
Lloyds TSB Bk plc 254 252 252 253
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 0 0 241 251
Morgan Stanley 252 252 251 251
Nomura Secs Co Ltd 0 0 238 245
Nordea Bk Norge ASA 0 0 244 250
Rabobank Nederland 0 0 0 0
Royal Bk Scotland plc 254 252 252 253
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0 10 251 250
SNS Bk NV 0 22 68 75
Societe Generale 259 257 255 255
Std Chartered Bk 0 0 243 253
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 0 0 238 250
UBS AG 257 257 255 252
UniCredito Italiano S p A 257 256 254 190
Wachovia Corp 0 10 251 251
Table 4: Number of Stock Price Observations for ’Spread Determinants’
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Factor Y2004 Y2005 Y2006
1 Inﬂation Index 40 40 41
2 Unemployment Rate 40 40 41
3 Gross Domestic Product 40 40 41
4 Housing Prices 40 40 41
5 Matched Funding 15 38 41
6 Wholesale Funding 15 35 41
7 Loan Loss Reserves [%] 11 26 29
8 Loan Loss Provisions [%] 14 37 38
9 Tier-1-Capital Ratio 8 26 30
10 Problem Loans 9 23 32
11 Pre-Tax Proﬁt [%] 15 38 41
12 Leverage 15 38 41
13 Long-Term Rating (Value) 15 38 41
Table 5: Observations of Low-Frequency Factors (N=41)
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